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After the stock market crash of 1987, Fischer Black proposed a model in
which he explained the crash by inconsistencies in the formation of expecta-
tions of mean reversion in stock returns. Following this explanation, a model
that allows for mean reversion in stock returns is estimated on daily stock
index data around the crash of 1987. The results strongly support Black’s hy-
pothesis. Simulations show that on Friday Oct 16, 1987, a crash of 20 percent
or more had a probability of more than seven percent. (JEL G10, C22)
I. Introduction
The report of the Brady Commission emphasized the role of portfolio insurance
strategies in the stock market crash of 1987 (Brady et al. 1988). According to the
Brady Report, dynamic hedging strategies were triggered on a large scale on Black
Monday and led to a downward cascade. This interpretation was criticized because
only a small fraction of the market volume was managed using dynamic hedging
strategies and the elasticity of stock demand implied by the magnitude of the crash
1seemed unreasonable (Leland 1988, Rubinstein 1988, Brennan and Schwartz 1989).
A small number of studies interpreted portfolio insurance diﬀerently (Grossman
1988, Black 1988, Gennotte and Leland 1990, and Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pﬂeiderer
1992). According to the theory developed in this literature, the drop in the level of
the stock market prior to the crash resulted in adjustments of the dynamic hedges
that revealed the volume of portfolios under insurance. This share was much larger
than the average investor expected. Therefore, during the bull market before the
crash, more purchases than expected were made to mirror a put option and not
because of fundamental information. This was in itself a piece of fundamental
information. From this point of view, the crash is explained by the shattering of
an illusion about the share of portfolios under dynamic hedging strategies. The
fact that portfolio insurance is unobservable makes such an illusion possible. The
transactions in stocks (that is, usually index futures) and bonds do not reveal that
they are meant to synthesize an option.
Fischer Black (1988) connected this idea to the concept of mean reversion in
stock returns. In his model, the underestimation of portfolio insurance translates
to an underestimation of mean reversion. When the true size of insured portfolios
becomes known, two things happen: The mean reversion parameter in the stock
price model must be adjusted, and the stock price path since the beginning of
the illusion must be corrected to where it would have been if the illusion had not
occurred. This latter correction in the path is the stock market crash. The model
is consistent with equilibrium since the change in the price process is caused by the
change in expected mean reversion.
So far, the implications of this mean reversion explanation of the 1987 crash
have not been explored empirically. The theory predicts that after the stock market
crash, mean reversion must have been higher than before the crash. Also, before the
crash two periods of diﬀerent mean reversion should be identiﬁable, one of relatively
2higher mean reversion before the illusion set in and one of relatively lower mean
reversion right before the crash.
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence from stock index data for Black’s
hypothesis. We specify a stock return model that allows for mean reversion and
estimate it on daily S&P 500 index data around the stock market crash of 1987.
The results strongly support Black’s theory. For about ﬁve years after the crash,
mean reversion was signiﬁcantly higher than before the crash. During the period
1982–1986 which was identiﬁed in the Brady Report as the bull market that led up
to the crash, a signiﬁcantly higher mean reversion than during the year 1987 itself is
measured. The report characterized the boom in 1987 as exaggerated. A generalized
likelihood ratio test for a parameter change-point ﬁnds evidence of a change in the
mean reversion regime in early 1987, supporting the segmentation of the Brady
Report. Simulations of the model for the 1982–1986 and the January 1987–October
1987 periods result in a probability of more than seven percent for a crash of 20
percent or more. A correction of minus 10 percent or more had a probability of over
40 percent. These probability estimates can be obtained without having to assume
heavy-tailed distributions for returns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II brieﬂy reviews the literature on
mean reversion, outlines Black’s explanation of the crash, and discusses the events
of the week prior to the crash of 1987 in this light. Section III speciﬁes and discusses
the model and Section IV reports the results of its estimation. Section V brieﬂy
discusses the stock market crash of 1929. Section VI concludes.
3II. A Mean Reversion Theory of Stock Market Crashes
A. Mean Reversion in Stock Returns
Unlike mean reversion in stock price volatility, mean reversion in stock returns is a
controversial subject. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) show that underperform-
ing stocks outperform the market in later periods, where “later” can mean anything
between three and ﬁve years. Summers (1986) makes the point that available statis-
tical methods have no power to discriminate between the null hypothesis of no mean
reversion and a slowly mean reverting alternative. Early studies that ﬁnd evidence
of mean reversion in returns (Fama and French 1988, Poterba and Summers 1988,
Jegadeesh 1990, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 1991) often use variance ratio tests
and autoregressions of return series to detect mean reversion. These methods tend
to reject the null hypothesis of no mean reversion too often (Richardson and Stock
1989, Richardson 1993, Kim, Nelson, and Startz 1998, Kim and Nelson 1998). Also,
segmenting the data into pre- and post-world-war-II periods signiﬁcantly reduces
the estimates of mean reversion (Kim, Nelson, and Startz 1991). Lo and MacKinlay
(1988) ﬁnd evidence against mean reversion in weekly data. However, De Bondts
and Thaler’s (1985) ﬁndings and their support in later studies (Jegadeesh and Tit-
man 1993, 1995, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) remain largely undisputed.
Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000) ﬁnd evidence for mean reversion in a panel across
countries.
Diﬀerent explanations are presented for mean reversion in returns, most promi-
nently over- and underreaction to news and momentum trading (Lo and MacKinlay
1990, De Long et al. 1990, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishni 1998, Hong and Stein 1999,
Gatev and Ross 2000), and time-varying required returns as a result of consumption
smoothing (Black 1990, Cechetti, Lam, and Mark 1990).
Lo and Wang (1995) study option valuation with mean reverting stock returns.
4Following Black (1988, 1990), we consider a stock market with mean reversion
in returns. Investors are assumed to form expectations of mean reversion. The next
subsections give an outline of Black’s explanation of the 1987 stock market crash
and connect this explanation to the model introduced in Section III.
B. Mean Reversion Expectations
Consider the situation in Figure 1 where at time t a positive change is observed
and consider an individual investor who expects that returns will revert quickly. If
λ is some parameter in the return generating process that controls the reversion,
her a-priori expectations can be represented by, say, the parameter value λ0,w h i c h
stands for a fast reversion. The investor takes the expectations of other market
participants into account, however, so she has to have an update scheme. A natural
way to update the expectation of mean reversion is to observe the market after a
change in the return. Therefore, between times t and t + h she does not make any
transactions but observes the behavior of the other market participants in order to
form an expectation which is some weighted average of her a-priori expectation in-
dicated by λ0 and the observed market behavior. If the market indicates a reversion
expectation like the one represented by λ2, the investor recognizes that her a-priori
expectation was too high relative to the market and consequently adjusts it to λ1,
for instance.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
We assume there are participants who act autonomously, i.e. who do not wait
for others to act between times t and t + h. These may be institutional investors
with predeﬁned investment strategies which, explicitly or implicitly, induce certain
reversion expectations. The parameter value λ2 can be understood as the mean of
their expectations.
5Alternatively, there may be investors who have similar expectations but who are
less risk averse than the individual investor considered ﬁrst. They may implement
a strategy on the spot market as if returns followed λ2 while being hedged against
the case that returns revert faster than according to λ0. This would allow them
to participate in gains arising from slow reversion while at the same time hedging
against the risk of faster reversion than λ0. Fischer Black describes these investors
as having more ﬂexible tastes for risk than the non-autonomous investor (Black
1988, p. 272).
Such a hedge can be implemented easily. Each reversion parameter λ0,1,2 cor-
responds to a certain index (or stock) price at any given time. For example, con-
sider time t∗ in Figure 1 as the investment horizon. Let S(t,λi) denote the index
price at time t corresponding to reversion parameter λi. Then, in t∗ the relation
S(t∗,λ 0) <S (t∗,λ 1) <S (t∗,λ 2) holds because at that time, λ2 implies a higher
return than λ1 and λ0, which in turn implies higher respective prices. The investor
could buy a put option at strike price S(t∗,λ 0) with maturity t∗. She could then
control her positions as if she expected the price to behave according to λ2.I f
the price dropped below S(t∗,λ 0) at time t∗, her exposure would be restricted to
S(t∗,λ 2) − S(t∗,λ 0).
The more risk averse investor could hedge against the possibility that the price
falls below her a-priori level S(t∗,λ 0) just as well. Her exposure would be S(t∗,λ 1)−
S(t∗,λ 0) which is less than S(t∗,λ 2) − S(t∗,λ 0), showing that her position is more
risk averse.
In the case where a decline in returns below the reversion level is observed, an
investor who expects a fast improvement of returns will hold her long positions to
avoid realizing temporary losses or will buy more to exploit a cost-average eﬀect.
The investor will tend to close short positions to take advantage of the temporarily
low prices. On the other hand, an investor who expects returns to revert slowly or
6to stay low for a while may want to sell her long positions in order to avoid possibly
heavier losses in the future. She will keep or even expand short positions to take
advantage of possible further downturns. Thus, after a fall in returns, the expecta-
tion of fast reversion implies higher buying pressure than does the expectation of
slow reversion. After an increase in returns, the opposite is true. Expectations of
fast reversion imply higher selling pressure than do expectations of slow reversion.
This translation of expected mean reversion into actual mean reversion is important
for the empirical test of Black’s hypothesis. It enables us to consider actual mean
reversion in stock price data, even though the explanation of the crash rests on
shifts in expected mean reversion.
Consider an investor who wants to hedge against the possibility of fast reversion
after a decline in returns. In order to take advantage of stable low prices, she could
assume short positions as if she expects returns to behave according to λ2 (which
now means that returns improve slowly). At the same time she could buy a call
option with strike price S(t∗,λ 0) and maturity t∗. The price relation at time t∗
would be S(t∗,λ 0) >S (t∗,λ 1) >S (t∗,λ 2). If prices recovered quickly, the investor
would have to cover at higher prices than she got when taking the short position.
If the price at time t∗ rose above S(t∗,λ 0), her exposure would be restricted to
S(t∗,λ 0) − S(t∗,λ 2).
As before, an individual investor who assumes an a-priori reversion of λ0 could
wait until time t + h to observe the market behavior. If she saw a reversion of λ2
in the market, she would choose a weighted mean, for instance λ1, just as in the
case of an increase in returns. This would imply smaller long positions and larger
short positions than according to λ0. If she hedged against prices higher than her
a-priori level S(t∗,λ 0), her exposure would be S(t∗,λ 0) − S(t∗,λ 1) which is lower
than S(t∗,λ 0) − S(t∗,λ 2), the exposure of the investor considered before. Thus,
after decreases in returns as well as after increases, it is risk-averse to expect fast
7mean reversion.
C. Mean Reversion Illusions and Disillusions
Assume that those investors who are risk-tolerant and buy an option while spec-
ulating on slow reversion publically reveal of what they are doing. Then, when
a risk-averse investor forms her expectations between times t and t + h, she will
not only look at the market but will also look at these public records. She will
recognize that the mean reversion expectations of the risk-tolerant investors who
are already active on the market are similar to her a-priori expectations, but that
they are hedged and take riskier positions in the spot market. Her perception of the
market’s expected mean reversion will be higher and thus her own posterior expec-
tation, the weighted average of her a-priori expectation and her market perception,
will be higher as well.
The put-call ratio is a proxy for these imaginary public records. If investors look
at a stable high market after an increase in returns to form mean reversion expecta-
tions, they can conclude from a high put-call ratio that the market’s expected mean
reversion is greater than indicated by stock sales alone. Conversely, if the market
stays low after a decrease in returns, a low put-call ratio indicates the same.
If the group of risk-tolerant investors chooses to synthesize the options contracts,
they hold hedge portfolios consisting of stocks (or futures) and bonds. Investors
cannot observe that the transactions related to these portfolios are designed to
mirror an option and hence there is no record at all. In this case, the risk-averse
investor will base her expectations only on stock sales. If the market stays high
after an increase in returns or low after a decrease, the investor will systematically
underestimate the market’s expected mean reversion. The information that the
risk-tolerant investors are not conﬁdent of a low reversion but hedged against a
high one is hidden.
8A crash is possible if the underestimation of mean reversion is a mass phe-
nomenon and not conﬁned to a single investor. This may occur because the ex-
pectations of the group of risk-tolerant investors are not, or are only rudimentarily
observable. For example, consider the extreme case where, except for the small
group of risk-tolerant investors, all others are risk-averse. The risk-averse investors
wait between t and t + h to observe the market and are not able to infer the true
expectations of the active, risk-tolerant investors. The position of the risk-tolerant
investors accounting for both their purchases and their short sales from the portfolio
that replicates the put option will be positive after a positive change. This assertion
is shown in the Appendix (Lemma A1).
Assume that the λ2-reversion in Figure 1 is the result of the risk-tolerant group’s
consolidated purchases and short sales. It is the actual mean reversion that results
as the average of the expected mean reversion of all decision makers in the risk-
tolerant group. Their sales and purchase decisions translate their expected mean
reversion into actual mean reversion. Next, when the risk-averse investors observe
λ2, they adjust their expectation from λ0 to λ1. That is, every single investor adjusts
her expectations without knowing about the others. The move from the mean λ0
to the mean λ1 is the result of all these adjustments. Denote the proportion of
the transactions by the risk-averse majority by α ∈ [0,1] and the proportion of
the transactions by the autonomous, risk-tolerant group by β ∈ [0,1]. The market
consists of these two groups only, i.e. α + β = 1. Then, the actual mean reversion
that will be eﬀective on the market after t + h is given by λ = αλ1 + βλ2.T h e
theory outlined here is valid as long as 0 <λ<λ 0, i.e. the actual mean reversion
is slower than the average a-priori expected mean reversion.
The situation described so far will be called mean reversion illusion in this paper.
The mean reversion λ prevalent on the market is lower than it would have been if
the group of risk-averse investors had seen the hedge activity of the autonomous
9group correctly. This misconception is disclosed when the true expectations of
the autonomous group and their hedge positions become known. At this point,
every single investor readjusts her expectations. The disillusion can also set in
if the majority becomes aware of its majority, that is, when it becomes known
that a large number of investors had expected a faster reversion but adjusted to a
slower one after observing the activities of a small group. These two disillusions
are independent: the information about the true expectations of the risk-tolerant
group does not imply that many others followed them. Conversely, the information
that a majority with expectations of fast mean reversion followed a minority with
seemingly low expectations does not reveal anything about the true expectations of
the minority.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
Accordingly, a stock market crash will be deﬁned as the mean reversion dis-
illusion. If one of the two possible disillusions occurs at time tc, it will become
apparent that the market assumed an incorrect reversion since time t. That is, the
price process followed an incorrect path between t and tc. “Incorrect” means that
it did not reﬂect the average a-priori mean reversion expectations of the market
participants accurately. The process has to be set into a position as if the illusion
had not happened. This means that the incorrect path has to be oﬀset, and stock
prices must adjust to the level consistent with the true mean reversion expectations.
The crash is thus not just a readjustment in one parameter. Instead, it is this read-
justment plus a discontinuous correction for the diﬀerence in the paths induced by
λ and λ0 between t and tc. The magnitude of the crash therefore depends on the
“depth” of the illusion (λ − λ0) and its duration (tc − t). Figure 2 illustrates the
point.
The sequence of events is (1) disclosure of the true mean reversion expectations
10of the risk-tolerant group, (2) adjustment of mean reversion expectations of the
risk-averse group, (3) investment decisions of the risk-averse group according to the
new mean reversion expectations. Because the new information reveals that the
actual and the expected mean reversion did not properly reﬂect the average a-priori
expected mean reversion for some time tc − t, the investment decisions not only
reﬂect a parameter adjustment but a switch to a diﬀerent trajectory of the stock
price process. The change in expected mean reversion causes a change in the actual
mean reversion, therefore the hypothesis is consistent with general equilibrium.
The argument is symmetric: It may be that during the mean reversion illusion,
the price process follows a path below the one given by the higher a-priori mean
reversion. When the disillusion occurs, this will cause an upward jump. The mag-
nitude of upward jumps is more restricted than that of downward jumps for two
reasons. Firstly, the majority of investors is likely to be risk-averse and therefore
more inclined to sell in the case of a crash than to buy in the case of an upward
jump. Secondly, most investors have no large cash position that can be unloaded
onto the market in such an instance. They have to shift investments and restruc-
ture portfolios, which leads to a delay between the decision to buy and the actual
purchase. However, in the case of a downward jump, investors who have decided to
sell will do so instantaneously.
D. Mean Reversion Disillusion and October 19, 1987
If errors in the perception of mean reversion expectations played a role in the stock
market crash of 1987, this would imply that there was an illusion and later a dis-
illusion about the market’s average a-priori mean reversion expectation. In the
notation of Figure 2, we are looking for the points t and tc and the related events.
We cannot expect any particular news event to cause the illusion at time t,s oi t
will be diﬃcult to identify t. The point tc is the point immediately before the crash.
11The disillusion is caused by a piece of information that is relevant for mean rever-
sion expectations and that surprises the public. Following the argument outlined
in Section C that a mean reversion illusion is particularly likely to occur if hedges
can be implemented that cannot be observed by other market-participants, we are
searching for the disclosure of large hedge positions. According to the hypothesis,
this implies that a group of active market participants was expecting a faster re-
version than the average investor perceived and that this active group was hedged
against this fast reversion.
The three days prior to October 19, 1987, are of prime interest in this respect.
From Wednesday, October 14, to Friday, October 16, the U.S. stock market lost
more than ten percent. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell from 2,508 at closing
on Tuesday to 2,246 at closing on Friday, the S&P 500 from 314 to 282 over the
same time. The loss on Wednesday was three percent, on Thursday two percent,
and on Friday ﬁve percent.
These drops can be attributed to fundamental reasons, namely to announce-
ments concerning the simultaneous budget and trade balance deﬁcits and to the
House Ways and Means Committee’s plans to eliminate tax beneﬁts for takeovers.
On Wednesday, October 14, the U.S. government announced that the trade deﬁcit
was about ten percent higher than expected. The dollar fell sharply in reaction,
and this led to an expected decrease in foreign investment. At the same time, it be-
came known that the House Ways and Means Committee ﬁled legislation concerning
takeovers (Brady et al. 1988, p. III-2f). Mitchell and Netter (1989) observed that
the losses on the stock markets in reaction to these news items were largely conﬁned
to the U.S. market. This indicates that the losses where the result of revisions in
fundamentals.
Portfolio insurance companies reacted by increasing their cash positions through
sales of index futures. They sold 530 million dollars on Wednesday, 965 million
12dollars on Thursday, and 2.1 billion dollars on Friday, the latter being eleven percent
of the total daily sales on the futures market (Brady et al. 1988, p. III-16). By the
end of the week it became apparent to market participants that these sales were,
by far, not suﬃcient to adjust the portfolio insurance positions adequately. The
Brady Report mentions another eight billion dollars that were expected to be sold
on the futures market. The implied volume of equities under portfolio insurance,
60 to 90 billion dollars, seems to have surprised the market. This may have been
the event that disclosed the true a-priori mean reversion expectations of the market
participants (Brady et al. 1988, p. 29).
The Brady Report explained the crash in part by the mere existence of portfolio
insurance and associated program trading that cascaded in the crash. The view
proposed here is quite diﬀerent; it follows Black (1988). In this view, the unex-
pectedly high portfolio insurance volumes were fundamental information, not just
a technical issue. They revealed that during the boom of 1987 a mean reversion
illusion had occurred.
III. A Mean Reversion Model for Stock Returns
An intuitive way to think about mean reversion in stock returns is to assume that
the returns process reacts to any deviation from its long-term mean. If the return is
above the mean in one period, there is a force that pushes it downwards in following
periods, if the return is below the mean, it is pushed upwards. Following Fama and
French (1988), Jegadeesh (1990), and Metcalf and Hassett (1995), we use a diﬀusion
model that contains a mean reversion term for the purpose of estimation using stock
market data.
The mean return induces a certain stock price, denoted by ϑt, which can be
interpreted as an estimator of the fundamental value of the stock or stock index. It
13is
ϑt = S0eµt,








Here, the term (ϑ − S)/S measures the deviation of the return process from the
long-term mean µ. The parameter λ ≥ 0 controls the speed with which the return
is pushed back to the mean µ. The average mean reversion time is 1/λ units of
time. Wt is standard Brownian Motion. It is shown in the Appendix (Lemma A2)
that the expected value of the price process satisfying (1) is
ESt = S0eµt= ϑt.
The process satisfying
(2) dlogSt =˜ µdt + λ(log ˜ ϑt − logSt)dt + σdWt,
where ˜ µ = µ − σ2/2a n d˜ ϑt = S0e˜ µt is a ﬁrst-order approximation to (1). This is
shown in the Appendix (Lemma A3). The solution to model (2),




is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Hence, (2) is a Vasicek-type model for log-prices








the process is non-stationary. The higher the mean reversion λ, the smaller the
variance because the process will stay within a narrower corridor around its mean
with the same probability. For purposes of estimation, the conditional distribution
of the log-returns logSt+1 − logSt given information through date t is relevant. It
can be read directly from the model (2):
(5) (logSt+1 − logSt) ∼N
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(rt+1 − ˜ µ − λ(log ˜ ϑt − logSt))2.
Here, T denotes the number of observations, θ =(˜ µ, λ, σ)  is the parameter vector,
rt = logSt − logSt−1 denotes the logarithmic returns, ˜ ϑt = S0e˜ µt as above. The
model is estimated by numerical maximization of (6) using the ‘dfpmin’ routine
from Press et al. (2002) and the ‘fminunc’ routine from the MATLAB optimization
toolbox. Both implement a Quasi-Newton method with line search using analytical
gradients and numerical Hessians. The derivatives are readily calculated from (6).
The unconditional distribution of the log-returns is given by





















Thus, the maximum likelihood estimates of θ =( ˜ µ, λ, σ)  will be asymptotically
normal and the usual statistical inference of maximum likelihood estimation applies.
The model can be criticized for many reasons. It is not a model of eﬃcient mar-
kets; the stock price process (3) is not a martingale. Within this model framework,
we will be able to provide an explanation of stock market crashes at the cost of
having to accept local non-eﬃciency.
The mean return ˜ µ is not trivial to estimate (Merton 1980). Hence, the samples
considered must be chosen carefully to make sure that the estimated mean return
is relevant to the analysis. We will use a change-point detector and segmentations
proposed in the Brady Report for this purpose.
The discrete time equivalent of the model is a ﬁrst order autoregressive process,
and we estimate it locally on diﬀerent segments of our data set. Recently, Hille-
brand (2004a, 2004b) has shown that neglecting parameter changes in autoregressive
15models results in strong biases in the estimates of the autoregressive parameters to-
wards unit roots. Therefore, a local approach and a change-point detection study
as carried out in Section IV is preferable to global estimation.
One might argue that when ϑt = S0eµt is an estimator of the fundamental
value, it does not make sense for an asset to trade far above or below this value.
In other words, a non-negligible distance logϑt − logSt should not occur. White
(1990) observed for the case of the 1929 stock market crash that during the boom
that preceded the crash, fundamentals were very diﬃcult to evaluate. This was
mainly because many new companies entered the stock market that had virtually
no dividend history. A similar case can be made for the internet boom at the turn
of the century. The quality of an estimator for the fundamental value that uses
any type of historical long term mean is questionable in situations like that. It
seems reasonable, therefore, to allow a process to deviate from the estimated mean
process.
IV. Mean Reversion and the Stock Market Crash of 1987 in Market
Data
The data are daily closing prices of the S&P 500 index ranging from January 4,
1982 to December 30, 1991, which provides 2563 observations. The series was
obtained from Datastream. All holidays that repeat the price of the previous day
were deleted.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.
We expect movements in the parameter of actual mean reversion corresponding
to the mean reversion illusion and disillusion around the stock market crash of 1987.
As outlined in Section II, the investment decisions of market participants translate
16their mean reversion expectations into actual mean reversion. When the risk-averse
majority learned during the week prior to the crash that they had adjusted their
expected mean reversion to an understated mean reversion (expected and actual)
of the risk-tolerant group, the risk-averse group adjusted their expectations to a
much faster reversion and subsequently sold stock to move the price process to a
level that reﬂected the average a-priori expected mean reversion. After the crash,
the investment decisions reﬂected the new mean reversion expectations and thereby
translated the faster expected reversion into faster actual reversion.
We will look at the disillusion, that is, the crash itself ﬁrst. The hypothesis is
that after the crash, we should see a faster mean reversion than before the crash.
A. The Mean Reversion Disillusion
The observations October 16, 1987, to October 26, 1987, are eliminated from the
returns and the price series of the S&P 500. This excludes the crash itself and the
large moves that followed from the estimation of the mean reversion after the crash.
Then, model (2) is estimated for the 100, 200, ..., 1000 observations before and
after the crash. (More precisely, before and after the gap.) Table 1 reports the
estimations.
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, p. 66) report signiﬁcantly positive esti-
mates of the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of stock returns, which is the
discrete time analogue to −λ in model (2). That is, if there is mean reversion in
the market, we would expect the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient to be nega-
tive. The simple autocorrelation does not account for a non-zero mean in returns,
however, as model (2) does, and therefore the positive autocorrelation can be in-
terpreted as an aversion from the zero mean. Estimations of model (2) on a rolling
window on the return series of the Dow Jones Industrial Average between 1901 and
2003 (provided by Dow Jones & Company), which are not reported here for reasons
17of brevity, resulted in consistently positive estimates of λ, that is, mean reversion.
Therefore, we can make a case for a one-sided test situation. However, all results
are strong enough to reject the null hypotheses of the two-sided tests, so these are
reported in Table 1.
The ﬁndings clearly support the hypothesis. Up to 700 points before and after
the crash, there is an increase in mean reversion. All estimations of the mean rever-
sion parameter λ in these samples are signiﬁcant on the two-sided 0.95 conﬁdence
level, and four out of seven are signiﬁcant on the two-sided 0.99 conﬁdence level.
As the sample size increases from sample to sample, the mean return is measured
diﬀerently each time. Except for the 100 and 400 points samples, a slightly higher
mean return before the crash than afterwards is measured.
These estimates are not independent; therefore model (2) is also estimated on
the corresponding opposite intervals of length 200. That is, the samples are crash-
1000 to crash-800 and crash+800 to crash+1000, then crash-800 to crash-600 and
crash+600 to crash+800, and so on up to crash-200 to crash and crash to crash+200.
Table 2 reports the estimates. The mean return concept applied here is a moving
200-day average without overlap. The estimates of the ﬁrst row are identical to
those of the second row of Table 1; the other estimates are not comparable to those
of Table 1. With the single exception of the intervals corresponding to ni = 800,
these estimates also support the hypothesis.
B. The Mean Reversion Illusion
As outlined in Section II, one of the deﬁning characteristics of a mean reversion
illusion is that mean reversion expectations can be implemented without being
noticed by other market participants, for example, by the use of synthesized options.
Furthermore, the fundamental value of the assets in question is hard to evaluate in
this situation. Therefore, the beginning of the illusion is not as obvious to locate as
18the disillusion.
In the notation of Figure 2, we search for the time t. That is, we search for a
point in the return series before the crash where mean reversion expectations change
from relatively high to relatively low. Since expectations cannot be measured, actual
mean reversion is used as a proxy. According to the hypothesis, the segment with
slower mean reversion should lead up to the crash.
The Brady Report locates the beginning of the bull market that led up to the
crash in 1982. The contributing factors are described as “...c ontinuingder e gulation
of the ﬁnancial markets; tax incentives for equity investing; stock retirements arising
from mergers, leveraged buyouts and share repurchase programs; and an increasing
tendency to include ‘takeover premiums’ in the valuation of a large number of stocks”
(Brady et al. 1988, p. 9, I-2). The level of the U.S. stock market by the end of
1986 is described as high, but not unprecedented, in terms of price-earnings ratios.
The appreciation from January 1987 through August 1987, however, “...challenge d
historical precedent and fundamental justiﬁcation” (Brady et al. 1988, p. 9, I-2).
Using this segmentation as a guideline, model (2) is estimated on the segments
01/02/82–12/30/86 and 01/02/87–10/15/87. That is, we set t = January 2, 1987.
Model (2) is then estimated on the 1987-segment with the mean return ﬁxed at
the estimate from the period 1982–1986. Figure 3 illustrates the estimations. The
estimate of the mean reversion parameter on the 1982–1986 segment is signiﬁcant
at the one-sided 0.95 signiﬁcance level. On the 1987 segment, mean reversion is
negligible. Thus, following the segmentation suggested by the Brady Report, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant change between the segments. This method is somewhat arbitrary,
in particular with regard to the appropriateness of the 1982-86 mean during 1987.
Therefore, we seek support for the segmentation suggested by the Brady Report
using a statistically rigorous change-point detector.
19FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.
In order to detect a change in the parameter vector of model (2), a Generalized
Likelihood Ratio (GLR) scheme is applied as a change-point detector (Lai 1995).



















where T is the number of observations, Θ is the open parameter set, fθ is the
probability density given the parameter vector θ, θ0 is the parameter vector of the
null hypothesis, and c is an a-priori constant. There is no analytical expression or
distribution result for the critical value c, so that it must be found by simulation
methods. The problem is substantially simpliﬁed by the fact that we search for a
single change-point.
Problem (7) is decomposed into the following steps. On a baseline segment of the
ﬁrst m points of the series model (2) is estimated, providing the null hypothesis ˆ θ0 =
(ˆ µ0, ˆ λ0, ˆ σ0) . Then, (2) is estimated on every single subseries {S1,...,S j},j=
m +1 ,...,T, resulting in a series of ˆ θj maximizing the likelihood functions (6)
of the subseries. From this series of parameter estimates, the probability densities




is stored. From the resulting series {Zj}j∈{m+1,...,T}, the statistics series




Zj,t= m +1 ,...,T
is calculated. As we search for a single change-point, it makes sense to plot the
{ξt} series. Figure 4 shows the series when the baseline distribution is estimated
20on the S&P 500 observations January 2, 1982, through December 30, 1985. The
series is then calculated for the observations January 2, 1986 through October 15,
1987. Using this method, the estimated mean is allowed to change with every single
observation that is added. The estimated parameters move away from the estimated
baseline parameters at two distinct speeds as the sample size increases. This is the
interpretation of the two trends in the series that can be distinguished in Figure
4. The trend break is at the turn of the years 1986 to 1987. This supports the
segmentation suggested by the Brady Report.
Critical values c for ξt are obtained in a simulation: 1,000 time series are gen-
erated according to model (2) with the parameters obtained from the estimation
of the baseline sample period January 2, 1982, through December 30, 1985. This
baseline sample consists of 1,012 observations. The sample period January 2, 1986,
through October 15, 1987, for which the detector series ξt in Figure 4 is plotted,
consists of 454 observations. Therefore, for each of the 1000 simulated time series
we generate 1466 observations. On the ﬁrst 1,012 observations of each series, model
(2) is estimated. Then, for each series the detector statistic ξt is calculated for the
remaining 454 observations, yielding 454,000 observations of the detector statis-
tic. The signiﬁcance levels reported in Figure 4 are the quantiles of these 454,000
observations.
C. Estimations of the Size of the Crash
Given these estimations of the mean reversion illusion and using only data available
on October 16, 1987, what would have been the estimate of the magnitude of a
possible crash? More precisely, given that the mean reversion illusion occurred at
the beginning of the year 1987, roughly 200 days before October 16, and given
that the mean reversion disillusion occurs on October 16, what is the distance in
the paths of the price series that must be oﬀset? With view to Figure 2, we are
21interested in the distance in the trajectories that is shaded black, measured at the
point immediately before the crash. Note that we do not estimate the time of the
crash, the disillusion is assumed to happen on October 16. for whatever reason.
To answer this question, model (2) is simulated with the estimated parameters
reported in Figure 3. Ten thousand paths of length 200 of model (2) under the
parameter regime obtained from the 1982–1986 segment are generated, using the
value 246.45 of the S&P 500 on January 2, 1987, as the starting point. If a mean
reversion illusion occurred in January 1987, it lasted for about 200 days up to
October 16, 1987. That is, without the illusion the process would have continued
for another 200 days under the old regime. The simulation thus gives an estimate
of the distribution of the index value Sno illusion(200) on October 16, 1987, without
mean reversion illusion. The actual value of the S&P 500 at the closing of October
15, 1987, was 298.08. The sample distribution of the diﬀerence log(Sno illusion(200))−
log(298.08) is an estimate of the distribution of the magnitude of the crash.
Table 3 shows the sample distribution of the diﬀerence log(Sno illusion(200)) −
log(298.08) in Panel A. Although the distribution is negatively skewed, there is still
a substantial probability for an upward jump because even under the regime with
stronger mean reversion there are a number of paths that end up above 298.08
after 200 days. The probability of a crash of minus 20 percent or more is greater
than seven percent. The probability of a correction of minus ten percent or more is
greater than 40 percent.
To put the endpoint of 298.08 into perspective, model (2) is simulated for 10,000
sample paths under both parameter regimes, the 1982–1986 period (Sno illusion)a n d
the 1987 period (Sillusion). Table 3 shows the sample distribution of the diﬀerence
log(Sno illusion(200)) − log(Sillusion(200)) in Panel B. Even after only 200 days the
diﬀerence in the mean reversion parameter λ results in substantial distances in the
trajectories and thus substantial probabilities for large jumps when a mean reversion
22disillusion occurs. The probability of a crash of more than 20 percent is higher than
10 percent under this distribution.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.
These sample distributions are calculated under the assumption that if the mean
reversion illusion had not occurred, the path of the underlying white noise process
could have been diﬀerent from the one that was realized between January 2, 1987,
and October 15, 1987. One might argue that the arrival of fundamental information
that makes up the noise part would have been the same in either case. Under this
assumption, we can reconstruct the white noise process between January 2, 1987,





ˆ µ + ˆ λlog ˆ ϑt +( 1− ˆ λ)logSt − logSt−1
 
using the parameter estimates from the 1987 segment.
Plugging ˆ εt back into the model with the parameters from the 1982–1986 seg-
ment generates a point estimate for Sno illusion(200) and thus a point estimate for the
magnitude of the crash. According to this method, we have Sno illusion(200) = 273.78
and thus,
log(Sno illusion(200)) − log(298.08) = −0.085,
a correction of minus 8.5 percent.
Thus, we have three diﬀerent forecasts of the magnitude of the stock market
crash using only data available on October 16, 1987. A point estimate using the
estimated white noise path from model (2) predicts a -8.5 percent correction. Two
density estimates, one with the endpoint of the price process ﬁxed at the actual
value on October 16, and one where this endpoint is simulated as well, result both
in a 7.5 percent probability of a crash of 20 percent or more.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.
23V. A Note on the Stock Market Crash of 1929
The stock market crash of 1929 can not be explained by a mean reversion illusion and
disillusion. The knowledge about the hedge portfolio of the Black-Scholes analysis
was not available and, therefore, it was not possible to implement mean reversion
expectations in the same way as 1987. There were a number of coarser dynamic
hedging strategies, for example, stop-loss orders, but these were easy to observe.
Estimation of model (2) in analogy to Table 2 on the daily closing prices of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average shows that there was no change in mean reversion before
and after the crash. The results are reported in Table 4. The observations October
26, 1929, through December 17, 1929, were deleted from the series because it took
almost two months before the Dow returned to normal daily changes. The results
of Table 4 are not qualitatively sensitive to the choice of this gap, and similar
results were obtained for only ten deleted days. Except for the single instance
corresponding to ni = 400, the change in the mean reversion parameter λ does
not have the right sign to support any mean reversion explanation. The estimates
are much less signiﬁcant than for the crash in 1987, signiﬁcance is found at the
one-sided 0.95 level in only two instances before the crash.
VI. Conclusions
Errors in the perception of mean reversion expectations can cause stock market
crashes. This view was proposed by Black (1988) to explain the stock market
crash of 1987. It is closely related to the models proposed by Grossman (1988),
Gennotte and Leland (1990), and Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pﬂeiderer (1992). These
studies rejected the widely held view that the mere existence of portfolio insurance
and cascading program trading caused the crash. Instead, they proposed that the
disclosure of large hedge positions came as a surprise and as a piece of fundamental
information to the market.
24When the average a-priori expectation of mean reversion is relatively high but
market participants can hedge against a fast reversion and these hedge positions are
not public information, a situation may occur that is called mean reversion illusion
in this paper. In that case, a large group A of investors adapts their high a-priori
mean reversion expectations to the low expectations that they infer from the market
behavior. Investors A do not know that the mean reversion expectations of those
investors B already active on the market are about as high but hedged, for exam-
ple, by synthesized put options that cannot be distinguished from stock sales and
purchases caused by fundamental information. Investors A adapt their expectations
to those that they believe are B’s, and the stock price process behaves according
to a lower mean reversion. If the true a-priori expectations of group B become
known, for instance, because a surprisingly large hedge position is disclosed, mean
reversion disillusion for group A sets in. It is now clear that the stock price process
followed a path that did not properly reﬂect the average a-priori mean reversion
expectations of all market participants. The process has to be set into a position as
if the illusion had not happened. This crash is a correction in both trajectories and
process parameters, and the change in trajectories can be of substantial magnitude.
We explore Black’s hypothesis empirically. Estimating an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
model for stock returns with mean reversion on daily data of the S&P 500 index, the
stock market crash of 1987 is examined in detail. Using the periods of the “sound”
bull market 1982–1986 and the exaggeration in 1987 identiﬁed in the report of the
Brady Commission, it is shown that mean reversion in 1987 was much slower than
during the period 1982–1986. A generalized likelihood ratio test shows a signiﬁcant
change in the parameters of the model in early 1987. This supports the segmentation
in the Brady Report and the hypothesis of a mean reversion illusion.
After the 1987-crash, mean reversion was signiﬁcantly stronger than before.
This supports the hypothesis that in fact a mean reversion disillusion occurred.
25The cause of the disillusion can be identiﬁed as the surprisingly large volumes of
equities under portfolio insurance, which became known during the week prior to
the crash.
Simulations of the model with the estimated parameters of the two segments
1982–1986 and 1987 show that a crash of 20 percent or more had a probability of
more than seven percent. A correction of minus 10 percent or more had a probability
of more than 40 percent.
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31LEMMA A1: The result of the market transactions of investors buying a stock and
simultaneously replicating a put option on it is positive. That is, the purchases are
greater than the sales.
Proof. This will be shown here for the case of a European put option. According
to the Black-Scholes model, the replicating portfolio of a European put on one share
of the underlying stock consists of a short position of |∆(t)|. ∆ is the sensitivity of
the option to changes in the price of the underlying given by












Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, S is
the stock price, X is the exercise price of the put option, r is the risk-free interest
rate, T − t is the time to maturity and σ2 is the variance of the stock price.
The proceeds from the short position are invested and gain the risk-free interest
rate r. Assume that the investor hedges every single stock that she buys. Her
position P(t) is (in terms of inventories)
P(t)=( S − S∆(t)ert) · n,
where n denotes the number of shares. The assertion made here is equivalent to
1
n
P(t) > 0 ⇐⇒ S>S ∆(t)ert.
Now, it is obvious that
1+e−rt > Φ(d1),
as the exponential function is strictly positive on R and Φ(d1) ∈ [0,1] as it is a
probability. It follows that
1 > (Φ(d1) − 1)ert =⇒ 1 > ∆(t)ert.
Multiplying with S>0 proves the assertion. 
32LEMMA A2: The expected value of the price process solving model (1) is given by
ϑt = S0eµt.
Proof. Rewrite (1) to
dSt =( µ − λ)Stdt + λϑtdt + σStdWt,
and solve the associated homogeneous equation
dXt =( µ − λ)Xtdt + σXtdWt,






























Taking expectations, we obtain
















LEMMA A3: Model (2) is a ﬁrst-order approximation to model (1).



















dt . = λlog
ϑt
St
dt = λ(logϑt − logSt)dt.








Deﬁne ˜ µ = µ−σ2/2a n d˜ ϑt := S0 exp(˜ µt). Then there is a ﬁrst-order equivalent of
the model (1) given by (2):
(A1) logSt = logS0 +˜ µt+ λ
t  
0
(log ˜ ϑu − logSu)du + σWt.

34Table 1. Estimation of model (2) on sample periods before and after the 1987 stock market
crash. The observations from October 16, 1987, through October 26, 1987, were deleted from
the series. The numbers in parentheses are quasi-maximum-likelihood standard errors according
to White (1982). The estimations of the mean returns and standard deviations are signiﬁcant
according to all common conﬁdence levels with the single exception of the mean return of 100 days
before the crash. For the mean reversion parameter λ, estimates that are signiﬁcant according to
the two-sided 0.95 conﬁdence level are marked with a single asterisk, the double asterisk denotes
signiﬁcance according to the two-sided 0.99 conﬁdence level. Mean reversion clearly increased after
the crash.
n days before Oct. 16, 1987 n days after Oct. 26, 1987
n ˆ µ ˆ λ ˆ σ ˆ µ ˆ λ ˆ σ
100 0.000483 0.010565 0.009632 0.001401 0.16636∗∗ 0.016239
(0.000613) (0.011637) (0.000827) (0.000114) (0.061999) (0.001703)
200 0.001172 0.005814 0.010373 0.000851 0.077153∗ 0.013997
(0.000401) (0.005729) (0.000581) (7.6e-5) (0.03205) (0.001075)
300 0.001004 0.024993 0.010127 0.000683 0.052885∗ 0.012292
(0.000133) (0.015156) (0.000592) (4.9e-5) (0.021259) (0.000859)
400 0.000672 0.016753 0.009907 0.000713 0.052938∗∗ 0.011204
(0.000110) (0.008603) (0.000496) (3.1e-5) (0.019714) (0.000722)
500 0.001062 0.013118 0.009516 0.000769 0.044117∗∗ 0.010935
(0.000103) (0.008098) (0.000425) (2.9e-5) (0.014459) (0.000699)
600 0.000834 0.015902∗ 0.009034 0.000715 0.033246∗∗ 0.01056
(6.4e-5) (0.006800) (0.000379) (2.8e-5) (0.011698) (0.000614)
700 0.000951 0.017962∗ 0.008701 0.000663 0.023374∗ 0.010297
(4.7e-5) (0.007320) (0.000344) (3.2e-5) (0.009914) (0.000554)
800 0.000801 0.015205∗ 0.008523 0.000541 0.008240 0.010536
(4.3e-5) (0.0059002) (0.000314) (8.1e-5) (0.005264) (0.000496)
900 0.000728 0.010165∗ 0.008546 0.000563 0.009867∗ 0.010475
(5.1e-5) (0.004539) (0.000289) (5.5e-5) (0.005016) (0.000451)
1000 0.000578 0.003738 0.008442 0.000547 0.009902∗ 0.010221
(9.6e-5) (0.002642) (0.000269) (4.5e-5) (0.004796) (0.000420)
35Table 2. Estimation of model (2) on sample periods before and after the 1987 stock market crash.
The observations from October 16, 1987, through October 26, 1987, were deleted from the series.
The numbers in parentheses are quasi-maximum-likelihood standard errors according to White
(1982). The estimations of the mean returns and standard deviations are signiﬁcant according
to all common conﬁdence levels. For the mean reversion parameter λ those estimates that are
signiﬁcant according to the two-sided 0.95 conﬁdence level are marked with a single asterisk, the
double asterisk denotes signiﬁcance according to the two-sided 0.99 conﬁdence level.
day ni through day ni−1 day ni−1 through day ni
ni before Oct. 16, 1987 after Oct. 26, 1987
i (n0 =1 ) ˆ µ ˆ λ ˆ σ ˆ µ ˆ λ ˆ σ
1 200 0.001172 0.005814 0.010373 0.000851 0.077153∗ 0.013997
(0.000401) (0.005729) (0.000581) (7.6e-5) (0.032050) (0.001075)
2 400 0.000672 0.016753 0.0099065 0.000713 0.052938∗∗ 0.011204
(0.000110) (0.008603) (0.000496) (3.1e-5) (0.019714) (0.000722)
3 600 0.000833 0.015902∗ 0.009034 0.000714 0.033246∗∗ 0.010560
(6.4e-5) (0.006800) (0.000379) (2.8e-5) (0.011698) (0.000614)
4 800 0.000801 0.015205∗ 0.008523 0.000541 0.008240 0.010536
(4.3e-5) (0.005900) (0.000314) (8.1e-5) (0.005264) (0.000496)
5 1000 0.000578 0.003738 0.008442 0.000546 0.009902∗ 0.010221
(9.6e-5) (0.002642) (0.000268) (4.5e-5) (0.004796) (0.000420)
36Table 3. Panel A shows the sample distribution of the diﬀerence log(Sno illusion(200))−log(298.08),
the latter value is that of the S&P 500 at the close of October 15, 1987. This gives an estimate
of the distribution of the magnitude of the crash. The probability of a downward jump of 20
percent or more was more than seven percent. Panel B shows the sample distribution of the
diﬀerence log(Sno illusion(200)) − log(Sillusion(200)) when 10,000 Brownian sample paths of length
200 are evaluated under both regimes, that of the 1982–1986 period (Sno illusion) and that of the
1987 period (Sillusion). This shows that the diﬀerence in the mean reversion parameter leads to
substantial probabilities for large moves when a mean reversion disillusion occurs.
Panel A Panel B
ri P(ri − 0.10 ≤ r<r i) ri P(ri − 0.10 ≤ r<r i)
-0.5 0.0009
-0.4 0.0053
-0.3 0.0029 -0.3 0.0221
-0.2 0.0753 -0.2 0.0751
-0.1 0.3652 -0.1 0.1572
0 0.4332 0 0.2333
0.1 0.1160 0.1 0.2297
0.2 0.0072 0.2 0.1687




37Table 4. Estimation of model (2) on sample periods before and after the 1929 stock market crash.
The observations from October 26, 1929, through December 17, 1929, were deleted from the series.
The numbers in parentheses are quasi maximum likelihood standard errors according to White
(1982). The estimations of the mean returns and standard deviations are signiﬁcant according to
all common conﬁdence levels except for the mean return estimation of the 200 days before and
after the crash. For the mean reversion parameter λ those estimates that are signiﬁcant according
to the one-sided 0.95 conﬁdence level are marked with a single asterisk. The mean reversion theory
cannot explain the crash of 1929.
day ni through day ni−1 day ni−1 through day ni
ni before Oct. 26, 1929 after Dec. 17, 1929
i (n0 =1 ) ˆ µ ˆ λ ˆ σ ˆ µ ˆ λ ˆ σ
1 200 9.6e-5 0.014254 0.013919 -0.000230 0.012919 0.015425
(0.000546) (0.014218) (0.001097) (0.000550) (0.010533) (0.000980)
2 400 0.001116 0.003449 0.012798 -0.001015 0.008857 0.016447
(0.000364) (0.003398) (0.000739) (0.000293) (0.005738) (0.000634)
3 600 0.000990 0.009946 0.011623 -0.001654 0.004993 0.021101
(0.000149) (0.007427) (0.000558) (0.000496) (0.005851) (0.001057)
4 800 0.000950 0.010573∗ 0.010688 -0.001663 0.008240 0.023915
(8.3e-5) (0.006111) (0.000471) (0.000273) (0.003719) (0.000906)
5 1000 0.000751 0.005945∗ 0.010145 -0.001415 0.005034 0.025005
(8.6e-5) (0.003410) (0.000401) (0.000224) (0.003759) (0.000881)
38
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Figure 2. The mean reversion illusion between times t and tc and the resulting diﬀerence in mean
reversion velocities λ and λ0 drive the log-price process above the λ0-level. The diﬀerence in the
trajectories is shaded black and gives the potential crash at every point in time.
























µ = 0.0005 
     (4.5e−5)
λ = 0.0060*
    (0.0034)     
σ = 0.0089
     (0.0003)  
λ = 0.0004  
σ = 0.0103
Figure 3. The bull market January 1982 to October 15, 1987 as seen in the S&P 500. Using
the segmentation of the Brady Report, we estimate model (2) on the period January 1982 to
December 1986 and January 1987 to October 15, 1987. The numbers in parentheses are standard
errors according to White (1982). Assuming that the mean of the 1982-86 period did not change
in 1987, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly weaker mean reversion in 1987.






























0.90 significance level (2.72) 
0.95 significance level (3.33) 
0.99 significance level (4.73) 
Figure 4. Change-point detector statistic series {ξn} as given by Equation (8). The baseline
parameter vector θ0 was estimated on the segment January 2, 1982 through December 30, 1985.
The detector statistics series was then calculated for the observations January 2, 1986 through
October 15, 1987. Two distinct trends can be observed in the statistic. This means that the
estimated parameters move away from the estimated baseline parameters by two distinct speeds
as the sample size increases. The trend break is almost exactly at the turn of the years 1986 to
1987, in line with the periods as given by the Brady Report. The signiﬁcance levels were obtained
by simulation of the statistic.
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